Within a broad sample of US manufacturing …rms, we …nd that increased governance quality is associated with higher levels of investment and greater responsiveness of investment to growth opportunities. High quality governance mitigates the underinvestment problem that arises both from incentive problems between managers and shareholders as well as from …nancial constraints. In direct tests we …nd no evidence of overinvestment. Furthermore, when we control for the extent to which a …rm is …nancially constrained we still …nd that, relative to …rms with poor governance, …rms with good governance investment more in line with their investment opportunities. This evidence points strongly to good governance mitigating underinvestment stemming from managers seeking the quiet life. We …nd no indication that the …rm's governance quality is endogenous to its growth opportunities in our sample. Overall, the results suggests good governance mechanisms improve the e¢ ciency of capital allocation within …rms, and that lax governance produces underinvestment rather than overinvestment.
Introduction
The only determinant of a …rm's optimal investment decision in a frictionless environment is its investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's marginal q (Tobin, 1969) . However, empirical research has repeatedly refuted this prediction of the q theory (Hubbard (1998) ).
Thus, it is natural to consider if the observed investment behavior can be explained by market imperfections such as information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf (1984) ) and agency con ‡icts (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) ). Existing empirical research on …rms'investment decisions mostly ignores agency problems by assuming no con ‡icts of interest between managers and existing owners. Instead, it assumes managers are aligned with current owners and focuses on how asymmetric information between the …rm and new …nanciers produces …nancial constraints that in ‡uence the investment decision (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Hubbard (1998) ). In a general theoretical framework, management can be thought of as making real investment decisions that deviate more from the …rst best solution of the q theory the more asymmetric the information, and the more serious the agency con ‡ict (Stein (2003) ).
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, we address the agency con‡ict between owners and managers by asking the novel question of how the …rm's corporate governance in ‡uences its real investment decisions. We do this in two ways by …rst examining the relationship between the level of the …rm's real investments and the quality of its corporate governance mechanisms, as re ‡ected in the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index. Subsequently, we analyze how corporate governance quality in ‡uences the responsiveness of the investment decision to the …rm's investment opportunities. Thus, we examine the in ‡uence of corporate governance mechanisms on the e¢ ciency of the internal capital budgeting process in allocating funds within …rms. As Stein (2003) notes, this question has been studied to a lesser extent than the e¢ ciency of capital allocation across …rms. Our approach is novel in the real investment literature, where the link to corporate governance has been missing.
Our second contribution is to show in what way investment behavior di¤ers with the level of governance quality. Several possibilities exist, which all relate to whether managers invest too much (overinvest), too little (underinvest) relative to the …rst best solution from the q theory. As noted by Jensen (1986) , overinvestment may occur when self-serving managers build unpro…table empires at the owners' expense. 1 The underinvestment problem occurs when managerial preference for a quiet life makes them reject new investment projects with positive net present value (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) ) or when incentive problems drive a wedge between the internal and external cost of capital (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). 2 1 Roll (1986) and Heaton (2002) show that overinvestment may also be driven by managerial hubris. 2 Underinvestment may also happen when management has private information about their skills (Holmström Finally, risk averse managers may overinvest or underinvest in ine¢ cient, diversi…ed conglomerates with low risk rather than invest more optimally in e¢ cient, specialized, and risky stand-alone projects (Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) ). Better governance can help to mitigate all three problems noted above.
The third contribution of the paper is to present a simple investment model and derive its implications in terms of the relation between investment and the ratio of output to capital, which is a fundamental economic variable. We show that the model predicts that under reasonable assumptions Tobin's marginal q and the output to capital ratio contain the same information. Therefore, we can replace Tobin's Q as the measure of investment opportunities with the output to capital ratio, which has the advantage of not including market values. This is important because the market to book ratio could be a misleading measure for investment opportunities when prices deviate substantially from fundamentals. This problem is potentially serious, since our sample includes the 1990s and early 2000s.
Finally, our fourth contribution is to address the robust …nding in corporate governance research that a …rm's governance mechanisms are systematically related to its economic performance , Becht, Bolton and Roëll (2002) , Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)). However, the channel through which governance a¤ects performance remains under-explored. That is, the governance literature does not tell clearly why well-governed …rms produce superior performance. Since real investments determine the …rm's ability to produce output, this is a key intermediate variable between governance and performance. Notice also that although earlier research has found governance quality and performance to be positively associated, this result does not imply that better governance improves the allocation of resources. This will only be true if better governance improves how managers respond to the …rm's investment opportunities. However, managers of well governed …rms may not be better than others at allocating real assets, but only at creating barriers to entry for potential competitors or at negotiating with labor unions. Thus, to understand whether governance drives the …rm's market value by way of e¢ ciency rather than rent extraction, the key is not the link between governance and market value. Rather, it is whether the governance mechanisms relate systematically to the way management allocates the …rm's resources. Our paper tries to shed light on that question by linking governance quality to investment e¢ ciency.
Analyzing a broad sample of US manufacturing …rms from 1990 to 2003, our overall …nd-ings can be summarized as follows. First, regardless of investment opportunities and the degree to which they are …nancially constrained, …rms invest more the higher their governance quality. Thus, better governance unconditionally reduces potential underinvestment.
Second, the higher a …rm's corporate governance quality, the more it behaves in line with the predictions of the q theory. Speci…cally, investment decisions by well governed …rms are substantially more sensitive to investment opportunities than investments by badly governed and Ricart i Costa (1986)) or are short-termist (Narayanan (1985) , Stein (1989).) …rms. This …nding shows that traditional real investment equations can be improved upon by recognizing the role of agency con ‡icts when …rms invest.
Third, using the methodology of Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), we test directly for overinvestment by examining the sensitivity of investments to cash ‡ow in …rms with poor investment opportunities. If overinvestment is a problem we would expect such …rms to be particularly prone to overinvesting and also to be sensitive to cash ‡ows. Moreover, this would primarily happen in badly governed …rms, since weak governance makes the …rm invest less in line with its investment opportunities and more in line with the availability of internal …nancing. We …nd no evidence to support this idea. These results are consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) who …nd that less monitoring by owners makes managers invest less rather than more in order to enjoy the quiet life. Thus, it seems empire building is not the typical managerial response to lax governance.
Fourth, we …nd that when we control for di¤erences in …nancial constraints using a comprehensive measure developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , real investments of well governed …rms'investment are still substantially more sensitive to investment opportunities. This constitutes strong evidence that, in addition to the potential impact of …nancial constraints, governance mechanisms mitigate suboptimal investment caused by agency con ‡icts. Moreover, when controlling for …nancial constraints, investments of well governed …rms are also more sensitive to cash ‡ows than in poorly governed …rms. This result is inconsistent with governance mitigating overinvestment. Combined with our …nding that well governed …rms invest more, we conclude that our evidence lend strong support to the notion that good governance creates value by mitigating the underinvestment problem that occurs when managers derive utility from the quiet life.
Overall, these results constitute novel evidence on why there is a positive relationship between governance quality and economic performance. It seems that one reason why …rms with better governance quality perform better economically is that they invest more e¢ ciently. 3 Our paper is also related to the literature on how the separation between ownership and control in ‡uences aggregate investment behavior. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) …nd that countries with a common law regime earn returns on investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital, whereas returns are below the cost of capital in civil law countries.
Similarly, Wurgler (2000) concludes that investment in declining industries is more e¤ectively curbed in countries with strong minority investor protection, which is more prevalent in 3 One problem that we share with other empirical papers that examine the economic role of corporate governance is the assumption that governance is exogenous in the model. This is both relative to other independent variables such as investment opportunities and the dependent variable such as investment. In our setting, potential endogeneity between governance and investment opportunities seems particularly relevant. One way this may happen is if …rms with attractive investment opportunities improve their governance in order to raise external funding at better terms. Using a variety of tests we …nd no evidence of such governance endogeneity. Thus, changes in governance quality are unrelated to changes in investment opportunities in our sample.
common law than civil law regimes. Several international studies …nd that strong shareholder rights are positively associated with market development, valuation multiples, and economic growth Levine (1993a, 1993b) , La Porta et al (1997, 1998) ), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Allen and Gale (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgic-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)).
Our approach di¤ers from these studies in several ways. First, keeping the legal environment constant, we study how …rm level governance quality a¤ects the …rm's investment decisions. This path is as yet unexplored in the literature. Second, we examine whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate overinvestment, underinvestment, or both. The second di¤erence is that we introduce the output (sales) to capital ratio as a novel measure of investment opportunities. Unlike Tobin's q, this proxy has the advantage of being una¤ected by security mispricing. Moreover, section 2 will show that the output to capital ratio is a su¢ cient statistic for investment under reasonable assumptions. Third, rather than making the assumption that all …rms face the same …nancial constraint, we allow this characteristic to vary cross-sectionally and hence in ‡uence the sensitivity to investment opportunities. Finally, while examining the relationship between corporate governance quality and investments more closely, we also explore what type of agency problems are reduced when governance improves. That is, we examine whether corporate governance mitigates the cost of overinvestment or underinvestment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives a simple model showing that the output (sales) to capital ratio as a measure of investment opportunities is a su¢ cient statistic for optimal investment. The data and the variable construction are presented in section 3, and section 4 contains the empirical tests. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Measuring investment opportunities
There are three potential problems in using the q framework to measure investment opportunities. First, q may not adequately re ‡ect future investment opportunities over the sample period. This is because the market to book ratio, which is the most common proxy for Tobin's q; involves market prices. These prices may not re ‡ect asset pricing fundamentals over a certain sample period. This has been a particular concern for the 1990s, which covers most of our 1989-2003 sample period. Second, a related problem is that if prices temporarily move away from fundamentals then managers may increase investment when prices are higher than fundamentals and decrease investment when prices are below fundamentals. That is, they will time the market in terms of when to invest and consequently investment and q may be related not because q measures investment opportunities, but because managers increase investment when prices are high and decrease investment when prices are low. 4 Third, Erickson and Whited (2000) point out that the market to book proxy for Tobin's q does not re ‡ect the …rm's true growth opportunities. This is because the market value contains the value of non-physical assets that should not be used by the …rm in its decision to invest in physical assets.
Given these potential problems in using q; we consider the output (sales) to capital ratio as an alternative measure of investment opportunities. This ratio, which does not include the market price of the …rms, is potentially a better measure of investment opportunities than the market to book ratio. We next present a simple model which shows that under reasonable assumptions, the output to capital ratio is a su¢ cient statistic for optimal investment. 5 We assume the following production function:
A is a constant, is the stochastic productivity level, K is capital stock, L is labor, and > 0 and > 0 represent the shares of capital and labor in production, respectively. We assume 4 Bond and Cummins (2000) argue that the market to book ratio is an inappropriate guide to optimal investment when stocks are mispriced. On this point, Shiller (2000) , Baker (2002) and others claim that there was a stock market bubble in the US during the 1990s. 5 It could be argued that using market values is advantageous, since they embed expectations of the …rm's expected growth opportunities that are not yet re ‡ected in current output. While this could certainly be the case, it would be more likely in industries such as high-tech and biotechnology. The argument seems less valid in manufacturing, which constitutes our sample. decreasing returns to scale, which implies + < 1; and that labor is costlessly adjustable. 6 Cooper, Gerard and Wu (2005) show that after labor has been optimized over, the production function in expression (1) can be presented in reduced form as:
where B is a constant, is a non-linear transformation of the productivity level, and = 1 :
Thus, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to and K:
Reasonable values of are in the vicinity of 0.9 (Cooper (2006) ).
We assume that the cost of adjusting the capital stock is proportional to output. This feature can arise if the installation of new capital entails disruption to production. Such a property of the adjustment cost function is commonly assumed in the investment literature (Caballero (1997) ). We follow Merz and Yashiv (2005) and assume that the cost of capital adjustment is both proportional to the …rm's output and convex in the investment to capital ratio. This assumption is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) that a model which mixes both convex and non-convex adjustment costs of investment …ts the data best. We adopt the following speci…cation for the adjustment cost function:
The convex component of this function,
is the form of the adjustment cost function adopted by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) . a + is an adjustment cost parameter for positive investment, and a is the adjustment cost parameter for disinvestment. As investment is largely irreversible (see, for example, Doms and Dunne (1998)), a is typically substantially larger than a + : 1 < b < 0 is a parameter related to the fraction of output foregone whenever the …rm undertakes investment.
Note that both the production function in (2) and the adjustment cost function in (3) are homogenous of degree one with respect to and K: As Caballero (1997) notes, it follows that the value of the …rm must also be homogenous of degree one in and K: Let J ( ; K) be the value of the …rm. The constant returns to scale with respect to and K property implies that:
where Z = K .
Optimality of investment entails an equality between marginal q and the marginal cost of 6 Note that decreasing returns to scale imply that Tobin's average Q, which is usually proxied for by the market to book ratio, can no longer be used as a measure for Tobin's Q: Only under constant returns to scale in capital and labor can Tobin's average Q be used as such a measure. See Hayashi (1982) .
adjustment (with respect to investment). Note that the marginal adjustment cost is
Also note that the …rm's output to capital ratio is given by:
which is a monotonic transformation of Z: Thus, for positive investment the marginal cost of adjustment, C I ( ; K; I) ; is positively and monotonically related to the output to capital ratio. This implies that the output to capital ratio is positively and monotonically related to marginal q: As investment is largely irreversible, investment is rarely negative, which makes the capital to output ratio positively related to marginal q most of the time. Therefore, the output to capital ratio is a su¢ cient statistic for investment. We will use this result in our empirical tests.
Data sources and variable construction
We use the corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) The IRRC describes the corporate governance quality of a …rm based on 24 di¤erent provisions in the law and the corporate charter since 1990 to the present. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick split these characteristics into …ve major groups, which they call tactics to delay hostile bidders, voting rights, director protection, other takeover defences, and state laws, respectively. They use these characteristics to construct a governance index score per …rm by adding one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights and hence increases the managers'power.
This index does not re ‡ect accounting data and ownership characteristics that could provide additional information on governance quality. For example, managers of …rms with high …nancial leverage and low cash ‡ow could be more disciplined to act on behalf of current owners because high debt and low liquidity restrict their ability to …nance value-destroying investments internally. However, these two characteristics have also been used as empirical proxies in the real investment literature to assess the role of …nancial constraints caused by information asymmetry. But, as just argued, …rms can be sensitive to their cash ‡ows and debt capacity due to con ‡icts of interest between managers and current stockholders. This agency problem may be independent of whether the …rm faces …nancial constraints that limit its access to outside funding from new …nanciers. This dual role of internal …nancing will be evident in our empirical analysis.
Our sample period starts in 1991, ends in 2003, and includes all US manufacturing …rms for which there is ranking by the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick index and for which COMPUSTAT data on several items that we specify below is available. We focus on manufacturing …rms since they are capital intensive, implying that their economic performance crucially depends on the quality of their capital investment.
Our dependent variable is the ratio of investment to capital, Based on the model in section 2, our primary measure of investment opportunities is the …rm's output to capital ratio (denoted y k ), which we estimate as sales (Compustat item 12) to capital (item 8). For robustness reasons we also measure investment opportunities by Tobin's q operationalizing it as the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value. The market value of assets is de…ned as its book value (item 6) plus the market value of common equity (the product of items 24 and 25) less the sum of the book value of common stock (item 60) and deferred taxes (item 74).
Following the extant real investment and the corporate governance literature, we use cash ‡ow and …nancial leverage as control variables that could be important investment determinants. Our proxy for cash ‡ow, cf , is de…ned as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) plus depreciation (item 14). We de ‡ate this measure by the book value of assets (item 6). Leverage, Petersen's (1988) method of …rst ranking by dividend payout and then using cash ‡ow as an investment determinant, the KZ index takes account of several characteristics that can re ‡ect how …nancially constrained a …rm is. Given this measure, a …rm will be classi…ed as …nancially constrained if it has high leverage, low cash ‡ow, and low dividend payout.
Our statistical tests use …xed e¤ects panel data regression techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity across …rms. This is done by demeaning all the variables in a regression.
That is, from each observation of x for …rm i at time t; we subtract the time series average of x for …rm i: The OLS technique applied to such demeaned data provides unbiased and e¢ cient estimates (Hsiao (2003) ).
Empirical …ndings
The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index score (GQ hereafter) ranges from 0 (highest governance quality) to 20 (lowest governance quality). They de…ne a democracy group as all …rms with a GQ of 5 or lower. A dictatorship group has …rms with a GQ of 14 or higher. In addition, we de…ne a non-dictator group, which contains all …rms outside the dictator group, i.e., …rms with a GQ below 14. Table 1 The summary statistics suggest that well governed …rms have better investment opportunities and invest more. However, this cannot be used as evidence that these …rms make better investment decisions. To understand this issue we need a more formal analysis of the relationship between investment and investment opportunities that conditions this link on the quality of the …rm's governance. Similarly, whilst the …nding that the volatility of i k is highest for well governed …rms may suggest they are more liquidity constrained (unconstrained …rms should have a smooth investment patterns) the fact that their mean i k is also higher suggests the opposite. Thus, understanding how governance, …nancial constraints, and real investments interact requires a more comprehensive analysis.
The level of investment
This section explores the relationship between corporate governance quality and the level of investment. Subsequently, in section 4.2 we examine how corporate governance a¤ects the relationship between the level of investment and a …rm's investment opportunities.
We start out with the following univariate model, which regresses investment on governance quality:
The results appear under model (1) (2)) is motivated by the perfect markets hypothesis. The cash ‡ow (model (3)) and the Kaplan-Zingales index (model (4)) are both based on the idea that information asymmetries may create …nancial constraints.
There is a positive and highly statistically signi…cant relationship between the level of investment and a …rm's investment opportunities. Like the extant literature, we …nd a positive relationship between the level of investment and a …rm's level of cash ‡ow. This is consistent with both over-and underinvestment caused by agency problems, and with underinvestment due to …nancial constraints. We …nd a negative relationship between the level of investment and the measure of …nancial constraints as measured by the KZ index. Since higher KZ index values re ‡ect stronger …nancial constraints, the negative sign suggests that as …rms become more …nancially constrained, they invest less.
Next, we run a multivariate regression which includes all four variables from the univariate models:
The results, which are reported under model (5) in table 2, support the …ndings from the univariate regressions except for the KZ index. Firms with higher governance quality invest signi…cantly more than …rms with lower governance quality, as the estimated coe¢ cient for GQ is -0.005 with a t-statistic of -2.27. The estimated coe¢ cient on investment opportunities is positive and highly statistically signi…cant. Economically it is important too: an increase in y k by two standard deviations increases the investment to capital ratio by twelve percentage points. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of the KZ measure is not statistically signi…cant in the multiple regression. Thus, the level of investment does not depend on the degree of …nancial constraints as measured by KZ in our sample. In contrast, the cash ‡ow coe¢ cient is positive and highly signi…cant. We will investigate later whether the cf variable is proxying for …nancial constraints.
These results show that holding investment opportunities and …nancial constraints constant, …rms with good governance quality invest more than …rms with lower governance quality. One rationale is that good governance mitigates the underinvestment occurring when asymmetric information between managers and …nanciers drives a wedge between the cost of internal and external funds. That is, GQ could be related to …nancial constraints in a way which is not captured by KZ. Thus, governance quality could in ‡uence the investment e¤ect of …nancial constraints. Alternatively, if we have fully captured the extent to which a …rm is …nancially constrained by the KZ variable, high governance quality could reduce the underinvestment problem caused by managers' preferences for a quiet life. Either way, our result is consistent with the conjecture that closer monitoring, enabled by better governance mechanisms, leads to higher levels of investment.
Investment opportunities
Given our …ndings in table 2 that the level of investment is higher the better the …rm's governance quality, the next question is whether governance matters for the way the …rm responds to its investment opportunities. In particular, the positive association between governance quality and investment does not tell us whether better governed …rms are investing more in line with their investment opportunities, just that they invest more. The models in this section separately regress investment on investment opportunities for …rms with di¤erent governance qualities. This approach allows us to explore whether investment becomes more tightly linked to investment opportunities when governance quality improves. If this is the case the coe¢ cient on investment opportunities will be larger the better the governance.
For each group of …rms sorted by governance quality, we …rst estimate the following classic univariate investment equation that assumes no asymmetric information problems:
The upper panel of table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (8) for the democracy group, the non-dictatorship group, and the dictatorship group, respectively. There is a positive, strong, and statistically signi…cant relationship between i k and y k in every group. However, the economic signi…cance is considerably stronger in the democracy group where the coe¢ cient estimate is nearly six times higher than for the dictatorship group. To get a feel for the economic importance of governance quality on the way a …rm responds to its investment opportunities, consider the impact of a one standard deviation increase in investment opportunities for …rms in the democracy group and those in the dictatorship group.
For the democracy group investment increase by over 15%, for the dictatorship group by 2%. Therefore, corporate governance quality appears to be having a large e¤ect on …rm's investment behavior. Democracy …rms are also more sensitive when compared to the much larger non-dictator group, i.e., all …rms outside the dictatorship group. This simple univariate setting shows that well governed …rms represented by the democracy group invest more in line with their investment opportunities than badly governed …rms represented by the dictatorship group. This is an important new …nding showing that corporate governance does matter for investment decisions. In particular, better governed …rms invest more in line with their investment opportunities than …rms with weaker governance. Does this conclusion still hold when we also allow for other control variables that are known to a¤ect the level of investment? The lower part of table 3 reports results from estimating the following model:
The …rst thing to notice is that the inclusion of …nancial constraints in the regression does not alter the …nding from the univariate model. Just like in the upper panel, …rms in the democracy group respond much more strongly to their investment opportunities than …rms in the dictatorship group.
Irrespective of governance quality, cf has the expected positive coe¢ cient and is statistically signi…cant. This cash ‡ow sensitivity of investment can arise for several reasons.
First, it might proxy for the degree of …nancial constraints, implying that …rms increase investments as their internal …nancing improves. Second, cash ‡ow sensitivity might stem from agency problems related to the manager-stockholder con ‡ict and the free cash ‡ow hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Jensen, 1986 ). Third, managers seeking the quiet life might be reluctant to raise external funds due to the exposure and scrutiny involved. Therefore, they invest only when su¢ cient internal funds are available. Finally, if our measure for investment opportunities is imperfect, then cash ‡ows might appear to have explanatory power if they are correlated with investment opportunities.
The estimated coe¢ cient for cf is largest in the dictatorship group. This could be because poorly governed …rms are more …nancially constrained since they are only weakly monitored and consequently have more asymmetric information. Hence, their investment depends more on cash being available. In contrast, better governed …rms have more access to external capital markets because they are better monitored and hence there is less asymmetric information.
The larger coe¢ cient on cf in the dictatorship portfolio is also consistent with the agency idea that poorly governed …rms overinvest by using all available cash ‡ow to build unpro…table empires. We test whether this is the case in section 4.3. Finally, the larger coe¢ cient on the cf variable is also consistent with poorly governed …rms allowing managers to opt for a quiet life. They want to avoid being monitored so they do not raise external …nance and only invest when cash ‡ow is available.
The coe¢ cient on leverage has the expected negative sign, indicating that more debt …nancing relative to equity decreases investment. The e¤ect for …rms in the dictatorship group is statistically and economically strong and much larger than for …rms in the democracy group.
This evidence is supportive of the notion that poorly governed …rms are more …nancially constrained. Like for the cash ‡ow variable, however, the evidence is consistent with an agency rationale as well.
Note that the cash ‡ow and leverage variables are important determinants of investment.
This is re ‡ected in the fact that when we add the two variables to the model by going from the upper to the lower panel, the pattern of the R 2 values changes. They are roughly the same across …rms with di¤erent governance quality when we only include investment opportunities in the model (upper panel). Adding cash ‡ow and leverage to the equation makes the R 2 much higher and particularly so for the badly governed …rms (lower panel). Table 4 shows the robustness of the results to measuring investment opportunities by
Tobin's q instead of the output to capital ratio used so far. We do this because q is the dominant measure of investment opportunities in the literature. Recall, however, that Tobin's q is not our …rst choice because it involves share prices which may misrepresent fundamentals, and which could also be used by managers to time their investments. The results in table 4 show that the choice of investment opportunities measure does matter. Like in table 3, the coe¢ cient for q is statistically signi…cant in all cases and is larger in the democracy group than in the dictatorship group. Still, the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients is considerably smaller.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient on cf is now higher in the democracy group than in the dictator group. This is the opposite of what we found when measuring investment opportunities by y k in table 3. This may re ‡ect that q is a weaker measure of investment opportunities than y k . When we measure investment opportunities by q, this measure may omit characteristics of investment opportunities which are captured by the cf variable.
Because the …ndings he in table 3 are based on a rather parsimonious investment regression, we tried a number of alternative speci…cations. We added production to capture the accelerator e¤ect and short-term securities to re ‡ect the possibility that the most liquid assets can quickly be transformed into cash to …nance investments. Both variables could matter for the investment decision (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)). We also added industry dummies to control for the possibility that high or low growth industries are driving our results. The results are largely unchanged by these robustness checks.
The results from the analysis of …rm's investments opportunities indicate that corporate governance play at least two roles in the real investment decisions. First, di¤erences in governance quality matter for how well …rms respond to their investment opportunities. That is, the real investments of well governed …rms are better aligned with their growth potential.
Second, di¤erence in governance quality leads to di¤erences in how …rms invest relative to their access to external capital markets. Investments in well governed …rms are less sensitive to the availability of self-…nancing. 7 They are also less sensitive to their current capital structure.
These two roles are consistent with the notion that good governance disciplines management in their real investment decisions, and that it makes other disciplining mechanisms such as …nancial constraints less important.
These …ndings provide the …rst evidence that corporate governance quality is an important determinant of the …rm's real investment decisions. In addition, the relationship we uncovered between investment and governance could explain why researchers have found a positive relationship between governance quality and performance. This seems to happen because well governed …rms are better at investing in line with their investment opportunities. The results have important policy implications since outside regulators can impose a given governance quality. This would lead to investment more in line with a …rm's investment opportunities and hence an increase in national wealth.
Overinvestment
The information arguments based on Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that …rms will underinvest. However, the role of cash ‡ow in investment equations may also be symptomatic of overinvestment. Firms may actually overinvest for several reasons that are all based on the agency perspective. Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1993 argues that managers will spend all available funds on empire-building investment if they prefer growth for its own sake. 8 Roll (1986) shows that overinvestment will occur when overcon…dent managers overpay for targets in takeovers.
Heaton (2002) concludes that overcon…dent managers will overinvest in general. In all these cases, the ability to overinvest for a badly governed …rm will be better the easier the access to internal …nancing. In this respect, the cash ‡ow sensitivity of investments of badly governed …rms may be due to overinvestment.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) examine the overinvestment hypothesis using Japanese companies sorted into two groups. The …rst group contains independent …rms, whereas the second contains …rms belonging to a keiretsu. The overinvestment theory predicts that …rms with poor investment opportunities are the …rms that are most likely to overinvest. Therefore, the investment of these …rms should be more sensitive to cash ‡ows.
Moreover, this sensitivity should be weaker for …rms belonging to a keiretsu because they are subject to closer bank monitoring and therefore less likely to overinvest. Thus, if overinvestment is prevalent, one would expect that the cash ‡ow sensitivity will be higher for independent …rms (less monitored) with poor investment opportunities. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) …nd no evidence in support of the overinvestment theory.
We re-visit the overinvestment issue with our sample of US …rms. We have an advantage relative to the work of Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) in that we analyze …rms sorted by observed, rather than assumed, governance quality di¤erences. In addition, we already know from our sample that well governed …rms respond better to investment opportunities. This is consistent with the agency idea that these …rms are more closely monitored by their owners. Therefore, well governed …rms are less likely to overinvest.
We limit the attention to …rms in the two extreme governance quality groups of democracy and dictatorship, respectively. Within each group we create a dummy variable that equals one if the …rm's y k is below the sub-sample mean (low investment opportunities) and zero otherwise (high investment opportunities). We add an interaction term between this dummy variable and the cash ‡ow variable in the regression. If overinvestment is important, we expect that the investment of …rms with poor investment opportunities are more sensitive to cash ‡ows, and that this sensitivity is lower for well governed …rms because they are better monitored.
The results presented in table 5 show no evidence of overinvestment. Both badly and well governed …rms with poor investment opportunities are less, rather than more, sensitive to cash ‡ows than …rms with good investment opportunities. Badly governed …rms are still more sensitive to cash ‡ow than well governed …rms, but the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients is higher for …rms with good investment opportunities than for …rms with bad investment opportunities. This is the opposite of what the overinvestment theory predicts.
These results indicate that for given liquidity, …rms invest less the weaker their investment opportunities. This …nding is very similar to those for Japanese …rms in Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) in that we …nd no support for the overinvestment hypothesis. Along with the …ndings that are suggestive of underinvestment in section 4.1, our evidence is consistent with the …ndings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that less monitoring by owners makes managers invest less, rather than more, in order to enjoy the quiet life. Empire building is not the typical managerial response to lax governance. 9 
Financial constraints
This section separates more carefully between the real investment e¤ects of governance on the one hand and those stemming from …nancial constraints on the other. Because …nancial constraint variables could re ‡ect the use of corporate governance mechanisms, we want to ensure that the determinants of investment behavior picked up in the governance index di¤er from those captured by the …nancial constraint measures.
As already mentioned, the KZ index includes several characteristics that can re ‡ect the extent to which a …rm is …nancially constrained, as well as certain elements of its governance. 9 Our evidence is also consistent with McConnell and Muscarella (1985) , who analyze stock market reactions to the announcement of capital expenditures in 1986-1991. The announcement e¤ect was mostly positive except in the oil industry, where it was typically negative. According to Jensen (1986) , the oil industry was characterized by chronic overinvestment in this period. low cash ‡ow, and low dividend payout. However, a …rm with low dividend payout may also be one where closely monitoring owners see no need to reduce management discretion over investments by paying out most of the liquidity as dividends. 10 In order to assess how governance separately in ‡uences investment while controlling for its potentially indirect e¤ect through …nancial constraint proxies, we …rst regress a …rm's GQ score on its KZ score. We then use the residuals from this regression as an expression of governance quality that is independent of …nancial constraints. We construct two governance quality groups. Firms with the lowest 7% of the residuals will be the group of well governed …rms, since they have the lowest GQ index score after having weeded out the part of it re ‡ecting …nancial constraint proxies. The remaining 7% of …rms with the highest residuals will be classi…ed as having the lowest KZ-independent governance quality. We choose a 7% cut-o¤ because it produces roughly the same number of …rms in the democracy and dictatorship portfolios as when we sort on GQ alone. If corporate governance quality is important over and above …nancial constraints as measured by KZ, we would expect the same pattern of governance-related sensitivity to investment opportunities that we observed earlier. Table 6 reports the results using …rms formed into two groups based on their GQ index that is orthogonal to their KZ index. There is still a large di¤erence in the coe¢ cient on investment opportunities between the democracy and dictatorship groups. The estimates re ‡ect that corporate governance quality does matter also after controlling for their potential indirect e¤ect through the …nancial constraint measure KZ.
Interestingly, when we neutralize the e¤ect of …nancial constraints in the governance quality measure, the coe¢ cient on cf becomes larger for the democracy group than for the dictatorship group. This …nding is supportive of the idea that better governance reduces underinvestment. Our reasoning is that according to the free cash ‡ow hypothesis, managers who are given the opportunity by non-monitoring owners will build unpro…table empires, …-nancing this overinvestment internally with free cash ‡ow. Thus, if governance mechanisms were mitigating overinvestment, the sensitivity of investment to cash ‡ows would have been weaker in well governed …rms than in poorly governed …rms. This is contrary to our …ndings.
Coupled with the earlier …ndings that …rms do not overinvest, the role of governance appears to be one of mitigating underinvestment, rather than controlling overinvestment by empire building managers.
Endogeneity
We have so far assumed that a …rm's corporate governance quality is exogenous, both relative to the dependent variable (investment) and the other independent variables (investment opportunities and …nancial constraints). 11 The corporate governance literature has been concerned with potential endogeneity between governance (independent) and economic performance (dependent). However, the most pressing question in our setting is not whether the investment determinants are partially driven by investment itself (reverse causation). Rather, the most serious endogeneity problem may be the one between investment opportunities and governance quality, i.e., between two independent variables. This dependence could arise if …rms with attractive investment opportunities improve their governance in order to raise external funding at better terms.
We want to assess whether we are safe to assume that the governance quality index (GQ) is exogenous to our two alternative measures of investment opportunities ( y k and Tobin's q).
In particular, we want to rule out the possibility that the governance mechanisms as captured by the GQ index are modi…ed in response to changes in our measures of investment options.
To this end we regress the changes in the governance index on lagged values of Tobin's q and y k : To check whether this relationship depends on the size of the …rm, we test these relationships separately for all …rms as a whole, for small …rms (…rms in the bottom 33% according to book value and capital stock) and for large …rms (…rms in the top 66%). 12 Table 7 shows that there is never a statistically signi…cant relationship between changes in the governance index and past measures of past investment opportunities. Therefore, we appear to be safe in assuming that governance quality and investment opportunities are exogenous variables in our sample.
Conclusions
The real investment literature has so far paid much more attention to the role of asymmetric information and the consequent …nancial constraints than to con ‡icts of interest and agency costs. Our paper explores empirically how the level and precision of the …rm's real investment 1 1 Most empirical papers in corporate governance implicitly assume that causation runs from exogenous governance to endogenous performance. A typical framework of analysis is to regress Tobin's q on a subset of governance mechanisms and some control variables in single-equation models, such as in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) . As argued by for instance Demsetz (1983) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , however, governance and performance are both endogenous if the governance mechanisms respond to the …rm's performance and vice versa. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) …nd that whereas several of their governance mechanisms are signi…cantly related to performance in single-equation models, most of these relationship become insigni…cant under simultaneous equation estimation. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) note that causality cannot be inferred from their …ndings.
decisions depend on the quality of the …rm's corporate governance system. That is, we examine whether corporate governance mechanisms improve the e¢ ciency of capital allocation within a …rm, measuring investment e¢ ciency by the sensitivity of the …rm's real investment to its investment opportunities. We also explore whether better governance improves investment e¢ ciency by mitigating the underinvestment problem (…rms invest too little) or the overinvestment problem (…rms invest too much) relative to the …rst best solution as predicted by the Tobin's q theory for frictionless markets. Our sample is US manufacturing …rms from 1990 to 2003.
Overall, we …nd that governance strongly matters to real investments. The higher the …rm's corporate governance quality, the more the …rm behaves in line with predictions of the q theory. Speci…cally, investment decisions by well governed …rms are substantially more sensitive to their investment opportunities and less sensitive to cash ‡ows than investments made by badly governed …rms. This governance-driven quality improvement in real investments seems to occur through a reduced tendency for well governed …rms to underinvest. Moreover, we …nd that governance quality a¤ects investment e¢ ciency both through mitigating …nancial constraints as well as independently of the extent to which the …rm is …nancially constrained.
Thus, our …ndings are consistent with the conjecture that governance mechanisms reduces the cost of underinvestment that stems from agency con ‡icts between shareholders and managers who seek the quiet life. This result is largely consistent with recent …ndings by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) .
Our …ndings suggest that the existing empirical models of real investment behavior would bene…t from adding corporate governance quality as a determinant beyond the investment opportunities and the …nancial constraints used so far. As for the corporate governance literature, our …ndings extend the insight by documenting that the positive relationship between governance quality and economic performance found earlier may be partially explained by an improved e¢ ciency of real investment. ) . Otherwise, the dummy is zero. This dummy is interacted with the cash ‡ow measure cf: If …rms overinvest, we expect …rms with poor investment opportunities to be more sensitive to cf , and …rms in the dictatorship portfolio to be more sensitive than those in the democracy portfolio. 25.63 Table 6 Separating corporate governance e¤ects from …nancial constraint e¤ects on real investment This table reports results from estimating the investment regressions after sorting …rms into two groups based on the GQ index that is orthogonal to the KZ index of …nancial constraint. 23.69 Table 7 Potential endogeneity between governance quality and investment opportunities This table shows 
